Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences.

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents into coalitions) satisfies some form of stability. The most well-known and natural of such notions is arguably core-stability. Informally, a partition is core-stable if no subset of agents would like to deviate by regrouping in a so-called core-blocking coalition. Unfortunately, core-stable partitions seldom exist and even when they do, it is often computationally intractable to find one. To circumvent these problems, we propose the notion of $\varepsilon$-fractional core-stability, where at most an $\varepsilon$-fraction of all possible coalitions is allowed to core-block. It turns out that such a relaxation may guarantee both existence and polynomial-time computation.

Fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) encode rich task-specific features, but the form of these representations, especially within MLP layers, remains unclear. Empirical inspection of LoRA updates shows that new features concentrate in mid-layer MLPs, yet the scale of these layers obscures meaningful structure. Prior probing suggests that statistical priors may strengthen, split, or vanish across depth, motivating the need to study how neurons work together rather than in isolation. We introduce a mechanistic interpretability framework based on coalitional game theory, where neurons mimic agents in a hedonic game whose preferences capture their synergistic contributions to layer-local computations. Using top-responsive utilities and the PAC-Top-Cover algorithm, we extract stable coalitions of neurons: groups whose joint ablation has non-additive effects. We then track their transitions across layers as persistence, splitting, merging, or disappearance. Applied to LLaMA, Mistral, and Pythia rerankers fine-tuned on scalar IR tasks, our method finds coalitions with consistently higher synergy than clustering baselines. By revealing how neurons cooperate to encode features, hedonic coalitions uncover higher-order structure beyond disentanglement and yield computational units that are functionally important, interpretable, and predictive across domains.

Community detection is one of the fundamental problems in data science which consists of partitioning nodes into disjoint communities. We present a game-theoretic perspective on the Constant Potts Model (CPM) for partitioning networks into disjoint communities, emphasizing its efficiency, robustness, and accuracy. Efficiency: We reinterpret CPM as a potential hedonic game by decomposing its global Hamiltonian into local utility functions, where the local utility gain of each agent matches the corresponding increase in global utility. Leveraging this equivalence, we prove that local optimization of the CPM objective via better-response dynamics converges in pseudo-polynomial time to an equilibrium partition. Robustness: We introduce and relate two stability criteria: a strict criterion based on a novel notion of robustness, requiring nodes to simultaneously maximize neighbors and minimize non-neighbors within communities, and a relaxed utility function based on a weighted sum of these objectives, controlled by a resolution parameter. Accuracy: In community tracking scenarios, where initial partitions are used to bootstrap the Leiden algorithm with partial ground-truth information, our experiments reveal that robust partitions yield higher accuracy in recovering ground-truth communities.

In this work, we consider the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, mechanisms that bounded rational agents may fail to recognize as manipulable, for two relevant classes of succinctly representable Hedonic Games: Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games. In these classes, agents have cardinal scores towards other agents, and their preferences over coalitions are determined by aggregating such scores. This aggregation results in a utility function for each agent, which enables the evaluation of outcomes via the utilitarian social welfare. We first prove that, when scores can be arbitrary, every optimal mechanism is NOM; moreover, when scores are limited in a continuous interval, there exists an optimal mechanism that is NOM. Given the hardness of computing optimal outcomes in these settings, we turn our attention to efficient and NOM mechanisms. To this aim, we first prove a characterization of NOM mechanisms that simplifies the class of mechanisms of interest. Then, we design a NOM mechanism returning approximations that asymptotically match the best-known approximation achievable in polynomial time. Finally, we focus on discrete scores, where the compatibility of NOM with optimality depends on the specific values. Therefore, we initiate a systematic analysis to identify which discrete values support this compatibility and which do not.

Hedonic games model settings in which a set of agents have to be partitioned into groups which we call coalitions. In the enemy aversion model, each agent has friends and enemies, and an agent prefers to be in a coalition with as few enemies as possible and, subject to that, as many friends as possible. A partition should be stable, i.e., no subset of agents prefer to be together rather than being in their assigned coalition under the partition. We look at two stability concepts: core stability and strict core stability. This yields several algorithmic problems: determining whether a (strictly) core stable partition exists, finding such a partition, and checking whether a given partition is (strictly) core stable. Several of these problems have been shown to be NP-complete, or even beyond NP. This motivates the study of parameterized complexity. We conduct a thorough computational study using several parameters: treewidth, number of friends, number of enemies, partition size, and coalition size. We give polynomial algorithms for restricted graph classes as well as FPT algorithms with respect to the number of friends an agent may have and the treewidth of the graph representing the friendship or enemy relations. We show W[1]-hardness or para-NP-hardness with respect to the other parameters. We conclude this paper with results in the setting in which agents can have neutral relations with each other, including hardness-results for very restricted cases.

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents into coalitions) satisfies some form of stability. The most well-known and natural of such notions is arguably core-stability. Informally, a partition is core-stable if no subset of agents would like to deviate by regrouping in a so-called core-blocking coalition. Unfortunately, core-stable partitions seldom exist and even when they do, it is often computationally intractable to find one.

We study strategic location choice by customers and sellers, termed the Bakers and Millers Game in the literature. In our generalized setting, each miller can freely choose any location for setting up a mill, while each baker is restricted in the choice of location for setting up a bakery. For optimal bargaining power, a baker would like to select a location with many millers to buy flour from and with little competition from other bakers. Likewise, a miller aims for a location with many bakers and few competing millers. Thus, both types of agents choose locations to optimize the ratio of agents of opposite type divided by agents of the same type at their chosen location. Originally raised in the context of Fractional Hedonic Games, the Bakers and Millers Game has applications that range from commerce to product design. We study the impact of location restrictions on the properties of the game. While pure Nash equilibria trivially exist in the setting without location restrictions, we show via a sophisticated, efficient algorithm that even the more challenging restricted setting admits equilibria. Moreover, the computed equilibrium approximates the optimal social welfare by a factor of at most $2\left(\frac{e}{e-1}\right)$. Furthermore, we give tight bounds on the price of anarchy/stability. On the conceptual side, the location choice feature adds a new layer to the standard setting of Hedonic Games, in the sense that agents that select the same location form a coalition. This allows to naturally restrict the possible coalitions that can be formed. With this, our model generalizes simple symmetric Fractional Hedonic Games on complete bipartite valuation graphs and also Hedonic Diversity Games with utilities single-peaked at 0. We believe that this generalization is also a very interesting direction for other types of Hedonic Games.

We survey two key problems-Multi-Winner Determination and Hedonic Games in Computational Social Choice, with a special focus on their parameterized complexity, and propose some research challenges in the field.